Bryant, John (2005), "Coordination, Fragility, High-Powered Money, and the Liquidity Trap: A "Tobinesque" Parable." Eastern Economic Journal, 31(2), 97-206.

Recently there has been renewed interest in production complementarity and coordination failure in Macroeconomics. Indeed, Evans, Honkapohja, and Romer [1998, 506] identify production complementarity as the only plausible mechanism for generating macroeconomic coordination failure. Colander [1996] and Cooper [1999] provide excellent overviews and Romer [1996, 294-299] an excellent brief summary. The particular concern of this coordination approach is with models of multiple Pareto ranked equilibria, where production complementarity induces the multiplicity of equilibria. A "coordination failure" is the realization of such a Pareto dominated equilibrium. The realization of such an equilibrium is "bad" in an unambiguous sense; that is, the economy is, in this circumstance, unambiguously malfunctioning. Thus the existence of such coordination failures provides a reasonable explanation of how macroeconomic problems can come into existence, even as all agents are rational.