Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model with Risk Averse Players

Abstract:

I study a multilateral sequential bargaining model among risk averse players in which the players may differ in their probability of being selected as the proposer and the rate at which they discount future payoffs. For games in which agreement requires less than unanimous consent, I characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs. With this characterization, I establish the uniqueness of the equilibrium payoffs. For the case where the players have the same discount factor, I show that the payoff to a player is nondecreasing in his probability of being selected as the proposer. For the case where the players have the same probability of being selected as the proposer, I show that the payoff to a player is nondecreasing in his discount factor.  This generalizes Eraslan [2002] by allowing the players to be risk averse.